MARINE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
The objective of the investigation conducted by the Japan Transport Safety Board in accordance with the Act for Establishment of the Japan Transport Safety Board is to determine the causes of an accident and damage incidental to such an accident, thereby preventing future accidents and reducing damage. It is not the purpose of the investigation to apportion blame or liability.

Norihiro Goto
Chairman,
Japan Transport Safety Board

Note:
This report is a translation of the Japanese original investigation report. The text in Japanese shall prevail in the interpretation of the report.
<table>
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<th><strong>Accident Type</strong></th>
<th><strong>Collision</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Date and Time</strong></td>
<td>At around 0403 hours (local time, UTC+9) on July 16, 2012</td>
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| **Location** | In the south-southeast seas of Yakushima, Kagoshima Prefecture (on the High Seas)  
At 149° true bearing, in the vicinity of 26.1 miles from Onoma Lighthouse located in Yakushima Town  
(Approximately 29°51.3′ N,130°48.9′ E) |
| **Process and Progress of the Investigation** | (1) Setup of the Investigation  
The Japan Transport Safety Board appointed an investigator-in-charge from Moji Office and another investigator to investigate this accident on July 18, 2012  
(2) Cooperation in the Investigation  
The Japan Transport Safety Board provided the documented information regarding Shoki Maru to Special Investigation Team of Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal, while the documented information regarding No.317 ORYONG was provided to the Board by the same institution.  
(3) Comments from Parties Relevant to the Cause  
Comments were invited from parties relevant to the cause of the accident.  
(4) Comments from Flag State  
Comments were invited from the flag State of No.317 ORYONG. |
| **Factual Information** |  |
| **Vessel type and name, Gross Tonnage, Vessel number, Owner, etc.** | A  
Fishing Vessel, No.317 ORYONG (Republic of Korea), 380 tons  
9042049 (IMO Number), SAJO SEAFOOD CO., LTD.  
(Republic of Korea)  
47.21 m (Lr) × 8.70 m × 3.75 m, Steel,  
Diesel engine, 735 kW, September 21, 1990  
B  
Fishing Vessel, Shoki Maru, 11 tons  
MZ2-157 (Fishing Vessel Registration Number), privately owned,  
11.95 m (Lr) × 3.40 m × 1.63 m, FRP  
Diesel engine, 205.94 kW, January 1, 1981 |
| Crew Information                  | A   | Master A (Nationality: Republic of Korea), Male, 45 years old  
|                                  |     | Fifth Class Deck Officer (issued by the Republic of Korea)  
|                                  |     | Date of issue: February 23, 2010  
|                                  |     | (Valid until February 22, 2015)  
|                                  |     | Chief Officer A (Nationality: Republic of Korea), Male, 45 years old  
|                                  |     | Sixth Class Deck Officer (issued by the Republic of Korea)  
|                                  |     | Date of issue: November 12, 2010  
|                                  |     | (Valid until November 11, 2015)  
|                                  | B   | Master B, Male, 58 years old  
|                                  |     | First class boat’s operator / personal water craft operator  
|                                  |     | with passenger service license  
|                                  |     | Date of issue: February 8, 1980  
|                                  |     | Date of revalidation: June 22, 2012  
|                                  |     | (Valid until September 17, 2017)  
| Injuries to Persons             | A   | None  
|                                  | B   | None  
| Damage to Vessels               | A   | None  
|                                  | B   | Crush damage on the bow  
| Events Leading to the Accident  |     | Vessel A, manned by Master A, Chief Officer A and 22 other crew members, was sailing in the vicinity of 31 M in the south-southeast seas of Yakushima in the course of about 299° (true bearing, and the same applies hereinafter) at the speed of about 7.8 knot (kn) while Chief Officer A was on the bridge watch together with an ordinary seaman.  
|                                  |     | Chief Officer A recognized on the radar Vessel B sailing southward about 7.5 M away in the starboard bow direction, and then some time afterward realized that Vessel B stopped at a distance of about 4.4 M in the starboard bow direction. Around 15 minutes later, Chief Officer A noticed that Vessel B resumed the navigation southward and was going to sail across the course of Vessel A from the starboard side to the port side, therefore he tried to communicate on VHF Radiotelephone and blew a motor siren.  
|                                  |     | Vessel A continued to sail west-northwest while maintaining the course and speed and closed in on Vessel B heading south, and at around 0403 hours on July 16, 2012, the starboard stern of Vessel A and the bow of Vessel B collided with each other in the south-southeast seas of Yakushima.  
|                                  |     | Upon receiving the report from Chief Officer A to the effect that Vessel B came in contact slightly with the stern of Vessel A, Master
A stopped the navigation of Vessel A and then checked the status of both vessels with search lights. As the result, he found no abnormalities either on Vessel A or Vessel B, and thus resumed the navigation.

Vessel B, manned by Master B and an ordinary seaman, at around 0328 hours, began drifting with the engine in neutral in the vicinity of 25 M in the south-southeast seas of Yakushima to engage in tuna long line fishery, and the crew lighted up, in addition to the navigation lights, two work lights installed on the right and left upper corners of the steering room’s front wall and three work lights on the stern deck to indicate the vessel’s presence, and began preparations of fishing baits and gears.

Master B finished the fishing preparations around 15 minutes after the commencement of drifting and began sailing in automatic steering mode in the course of 180°. He commanded the ordinary seaman to be near the starboard side passage way on the stern deck for changing baskets containing the long lines, sitting on a space at the port stern corner facing starboard while hanging the remote navigation controller on the bitt near his position. Master B also reminded the ordinary seaman to carry out the work while keeping the lookout on the starboard side and began casting lines with live horse mackerel on the hooks.

While Vessel B was sailing south at the speed of about 6.3 kn and the lines were being cast, Master B had finished casting about 80% of the long lines in the second basket, having paid attention to the port side from time to time by looking back in that direction between the intervals of the hooks were paid out, and the ordinary seaman was just kneeling down facing port in order to prepare the next basket, when the vessel collided with Vessel A.

The ordinary seaman looked around and saw Vessel A on the starboard bow sailing away westward, and saw the Korean letters on the shell plating.

While Master B was observing the movement of Vessel A, checking the damage status of the hull, Vessel A gradually slowed down and stopped at a distance of 0.3 M from Vessel B and a number of lights on the deck were turned on, but a few minutes later, Vessel A began sailing again westward.

After collecting the long lines, Master B navigated the vessel and came into a mobile phone coverage, about 20 M in the southeastern seas of Tanegashima, Kagoshima Prefecture at around
0845 hours and reported the accident to Japan Coast Guard.

| Weather and Sea Conditions | Weather condition:  
Weather – Fair  
Winds direction – SW  
Wind force – 1  
Visibility – Fair  
Sea condition: Calm |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Other Information         | On Vessel B, a structure containing the steering room is positioned almost in the middle of the hull between the bow and stern decks, the upper section and both sides of the stern deck were surrounded with walls made of FRP, and on both sides of the structure were passage ways connecting the bow and stern decks where on the port side passage way there were baskets containing the long lines and floats were stacked up high.  
Vessel B was set the guard ring of the radar that sounds off alarm when another vessel approaches within the range of 2 M on the radar with speakers installed in the rear section of the steering room that amplify the alarm, but Master B did not hear the alarm.  
One set of the long lines loaded on Vessel B consisted of a main line of about 2,000 m in length and 40 branch lines tied to the main line at the intervals of about 50 m and it was contained in a plastic basket. It took around 7 minutes to cast one line and on the day of the accident, 20 baskets were planned to be cast. |
| Analysis                  | A: Applicable, B: Applicable  
A: Not applicable, B: Not applicable  
A: Not applicable, B: Not applicable  
It is probable that while Vessel A was sailing west-northwest in the south-southeast seas of Yakushima, although Chief Officer A saw Vessel B that had been sailing southward in the starboard bow direction began drifting and then resumed to navigate southward in a situation of sailing across the course of Vessel A from the starboard side to the port side, he continued sailing west-northwest, maintaining the course and speed, and thus the vessel collided with Vessel B.  
It is probable that while Vessel B was sailing southward casting the fishing lines, Master B was not properly on the lookout as he was casting the lines toward the stern, facing starboard, and looking port from time to time by turning back in that direction, and thus he was not aware of Vessel A closing in from the port bow |
direction and the vessel collided with Vessel A.

| Probable Causes | It is probable that this accident took place while Vessel A was sailing west-northwest in the south-southeast seas of Yakushima and Vessel B was sailing southward casting the fishing lines, Chief Officer A continued to navigate maintaining the course and the speed and Master B did not keep a proper lookout in the port bow direction, and thus the vessels collided with each other. |
| Safety Actions | The following measures are possible to prevent the recurrence of similar accidents:
  • In case another vessel is closing in from the starboard bow direction, the risk of collision shall be determined immediately and appropriate measures for avoiding collision shall be taken by the give-way vessel as soon as possible.
  • Proper lookout shall be kept even when engaging in fishing operation. |