Railway accident investigation report

Railway operator: Japan Freight Railway Company.
Accident type: Train derailment.
Date and time: About 18:05, September 19, 2013.
Location: In the premises of Onuma station, Hakodate Line, Nanae Town, Kameda District, Hokkaido.

SUMMARY
On September 19, 2013, the Extra High Speed Freight 8054 train, composed of 18 vehicles, starting from Obihiro Freight station bound for Kumagaya Freight Terminal station, of Japan Freight Railway Corporation, departed from Higashi-Muroran yard on schedule and arrived at No.2 track, passing track for up line, of Onuma station at 17:15, 2 minutes behind schedule. After that, the train driver started the train on schedule. While the train was running in powering operation at the velocity of about 20 km/h, the train driver felt the drag force from the rear and found reduction of the brake pipe pressure and increase of the brake cylinder pressure by the pressure gauges on the operator console, and immediately switched off the master controller handle. Then the train stopped just after that.

After the train had stopped, the train driver got off the train and inspected the situation, and found that the all 2 axles in the rear bogie of the 6th vehicle, the all 2 axles in the front bogie of the 7th vehicle, the all 4 axles of the 8th vehicle and the all 2 axles in the front bogie of the 9th vehicle were derailed.
There was the train driver alone onboard the train, but he was not injured.

PROBABLE CAUSES
It is highly probable that the accident had occurred as the left wheels in the rear bogie of the 6th vehicle derailed to inside of the track by the lateral motion and tilting of the rail due to large lateral force generated while the train passed around the accident site, where the track was in the states that the gauge was easily widened due to the effects of the alignment extremely exceeding the maintenance standard values, by the lateral force caused by the passing trains, because the maintenance works were not implemented properly although the alignment and the irregularity of gauge exceeded the maintenance standard values extremely.
It is probable that the track were not maintained although the alignment etc. were extremely exceeded the maintenance standard values, because the required maintenance work was not planned referring the recent inspection results for the track irregularity.
It is probable that the above situation was caused by a lack of the fundamental understandings as the staffs engaged in the track maintenance that the track maintenance should be implemented even for the passing track based on the inspection results obeying to the implementation standard, in the inspectors, staffs in charge of maintenance planning and whole the Onuma track maintenance branch, furthermore, the deputy manager (the assistant director) did not confirm the inspected
results and the implemented results of maintenance works following the inspected results.
In addition, it is probable that Hakodate regional track maintenance office did not manage properly
the track maintenance works implemented by Onuma track maintenance branch.
Furthermore, it is somewhat likely that it was related to the occurrence of the accident that the track
maintenance division of the head office did not check properly the status of track maintenance
works implemented by the onsite maintenance sections.