Railway accident investigation report

Railway operator : Japan Freight Railway Company
Accident type : Train collision
Date and time : About 23:14, February 17, 2015
Location : In the premises of Sapporo Freight Terminal station, Hakodate Line, Sapporo City, Hokkaido

SUMMARY
On February 17, 2015, the Shunting 51 shunting locomotive, single locomotive train set, of Japan Freight Railway Company, running from Shiroishi passage line to the direction of Atsubetsu station in the Yard No.2 line, in the premises of Sapporo Freight Terminal station, obeying to the shunting sign shown by the shunting staff, ran over the car stop indicator in the direction to Atsubetsu station and stopped disturbing the next line.

On the other hand, High Speed Freight 2092 train, 16 vehicle train set composed of a locomotive and 15 freight wagons, started from Kushiro Freight station bound for Sapporo Freight Terminal station, passed Shin-Sapporo station on schedule, 23:09, and entered into the premises of Sapporo Freight terminal station towards the scheduled arrival line, the Yard No.1 line. When the train passed through the side of the shunting locomotive at a speed of about 33 km/h, the train driver noticed the sound to bump against something and immediately took an emergency brake. The train stopped after running about 50 m.

After the train stopped, the train driver got off the train and checked the situation. It was found that the side of the first vehicle of the train collided with the shunting locomotive in the Yard No.2 line. There was a train driver each in the train and the shunting locomotive, but no one was injured.

PROBABLE CAUSES
It is highly probable that the accident occurred because the shunting locomotive had stopped disturbing the next line, the side of the locomotive of the High Speed Freight train running in the next line collided with the shunting locomotive, in the premises of Sapporo Freight terminal station.

It is somewhat likely that the shunting locomotive stopped disturbing the next line because the braking operation by the train driver of the shunting locomotive had delayed because it is somewhat likely that the indication of shunting sign "stop" was delayed as the shunting staff did not notice that the shunting locomotive had approached to the predetermined position. It is somewhat likely that the shunting staff did not noticed that the shunting locomotive approached the predetermined stop position because he guided the shunting locomotive, while considering the operation procedure.

It is somewhat likely that the braking operation by the train driver of the shunting locomotive was effected by his misunderstanding due to mistake in listening that the terminal point of the shunting section, i.e., guided section, was changed, and carried out shunting operation without one stop at the predetermined position.

It is somewhat likely that these situations were participated with that the related staffs of the station
did not correctly understand the operation manual of the station management of the company, regulating "one operation should be subjected to one operation statement". Furthermore, it is somewhat likely that no one of the related staffs took the procedures such as an emergency stop operation when they recognized the approaching train in the next track while the shunting locomotive stopped with disturbing the next track.