

JTSB Safety Recommendation to the PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL LINES LIMITED

May 30, 2014

Marine Accident between
Container ship “KOTA DUTA” and Cargo ship “TANYA KARPINSKAYA” (Collision)
Occurred at Port of Niigata Higashi Ku, Niigata City, Niigata Prefecture
Vicinity of 180° true, 4,900m from Port of Niigata Higashi Ku
West Breakwater Lighthouse, Japan
on February 7, 2012.

It is probable that this accident occurred because KOTA DUTA and TANYA KARPINSKAYA collided with each other due to the facts that the master of KOTA DUTA and the master of TANYA KARPINSKAYA agreed to the conduct of vessel for both vessels to alter to port to pass on the starboard side via VHF, that the vessels continued to navigate after the master of KOTA DUTA put the helm hard to port and the master of TANYA KARPINSKAYA put the helm to port at 15° in an attempt to execute the agreement, and that they kept approaching each other in the situation that was different from the agreed conduct of vessel without being able to recognize any change in the heading when the vessels approached each other in the situation in which their courses would cross where the Dredged Passages crossed while KOTA DUTA was proceeding northeast after leaving the West Wharf No.3 Quay and while TANYA KARPINSKAYA was proceeding south-southeast from the Central Wharf East Quay toward the South Wharf in Port of Niigata Higashi Ku.

It is probable that the master of KOTA DUTA agreed to the conduct of vessel, believed that TANYA KARPINSKAYA would execute the contents agreed to via VHF despite the difference between the anticipated actions of TANYA KARPINSKAYA according to the master of KOTA DUTA and the actual actions, and continued to approach in the situation in which he could not recognize any change in the heading due to the fact that he was convinced that TANYA KARPINSKAYA was going to pass on the starboard side due to the facts that TANYA KARPINSKAYA re-confirmed to pass on the starboard side, that TANYA KARPINSKAYA was strongly stating “starboard to starboard” via VHF, that he felt that the report by the former master of KOTA DUTA had a strong tone, saying “starboard to starboard,” and that the former master of KOTA DUTA, who was on board to hand over the master position, and the master of TANYA KARPINSKAYA were stating “starboard to starboard.”

It is probable that the former master of KOTA DUTA did not tell the master of KOTA DUTA that it would be safer for KOTA DUTA to stop without changing the course and observe the movements of TANYA KARPINSKAYA in order to avoid

collision with TANYA KARPINSKAYA due to the fact that PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL LINES LIMITED had not specified supernumeraries as members of the bridge team.

Third officer of KOTA DUTA set the radar range scale to 0.5M at the time of departure stand-by and changed the range scale to 0.75M when he recognized the image of TANYA KARPINSKAYA on the edge of the 0.5M radar display during navigation. However, it is probable that he could have reported the information of TANYA KARPINSKAYA to the master before the master of KOTA DUTA recognized the said vessel if he had correctly understood BRM contents and items necessary to ensure safety navigation, such as detecting information on nearby vessels underway as early as possible by changing to a long distance range scale.

Due to this, the Japan Transport Safety Board recommends PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL LINES LIMITED to take the following measures to ensure safety during navigation in view of the results of this accident investigation.

- (1) Consider that supernumeraries are part of the bridge team if they are practically involved in maneuvering.
- (2) Instruct crew members of vessels belonging to PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL LINES LIMITED and vessels under their management to conduct BRM education and training by learning from this accident case so that those on watch on the bridge can collect safety-related information on radar and other equipment and proactively provide it to the person conning the vessel.
- (3) Instruct officers of vessels belonging to PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL LINES LIMITED and vessels under their management to prepare for departure and keep look-out while correctly understanding items necessary to ensure safety navigation, such as detecting information on nearby vessels underway as early as possible by changing the radar range scale and conduct education by learning from this accident case when visiting the vessels.
- (4) Have masters of vessels belonging to PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL LINES LIMITED and vessels under their management re-acknowledge the following risks of using VHF by using this accident case and promote awareness by establishing items to reconfirm the risks of using VHF in a checklist to be used to navigate in narrow channels and congested waters.
 - (i) It is possible that two vessels approach each other and have no time to take actions to avoid collision in case the agreement is not executed if those persons conning the two vessels take time to agree on the conduct of vessel and the vessels navigate in the original course at the original speed during

that time.

- (ii) It is possible that those persons conning the vessels would believe that the other vessel would execute the contents to which they had agreed via VHF even if there is a difference between the anticipated actions of the other vessel according to the person conning the vessel and the actual actions after agreeing on the conduct of vessel and lose the opportunity to take actions to avoid collision.